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Introduction
The developing countries' experiences with regional and sub-regio-
nal preferential trading arrangements are manifold but disappoint-
ing . Nonetheless despite these disappointments and shortcomings
developing countries have not been deterred from starting another,
even more ambitious trading arrangement: the UNCTAD approach to a
discriminatory, reciprocal Global System of Trade Preferences
based on a common tariff-cutting formula instead of an item-by-
item approach .
Encouraged by the incorporation of "differential treatment" into
the 1979 Tokyo Round framework of conduct, developing countries as
a bloc, mostly because of political reasons, still favour discrimi-
nation in North-South trade and reciprocal arrangements among them-
selves. The apologists for collective self-reliance continue to
plead for discrimination as an instrument to divert trade from
Paper to be presented at the World Bank Conference on "South-
South or South-North Trade" in Brussels, February 28 - March 1,
1983. The paper reports on research undertaken in a project on
economic policy determinants of South-South trade which receives
financial support from the VW-foundation.
Comments received by Juergen B. Donges and Dean Spinanger on an
earlier draft are gratefully acknowledged.
Thanks are due to the computational assistance provided by
Julia Feldmeier, Ursula Hartig and Ingeborg Optenhofel.
For information the following can be mentioned: the apparent
failures of LAFTA, EAC, and CACM, the small weight of the franco-
phone communities CEAO and UDEAC in West and Central Africa, the
shortcomings of ECOWAS, the Andean group, the GATT protocol and
the Tripartite Agreement, as well as the difficulties of ASEAN
to reconcile outward-looking development strategies with inward-
looking trade liberalization.
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This approach was officially launched in 1979 during UNCTAD V
and still encompasses a confusing package of reciprocal tariff
cuts, non-reciprocal concessions for land-locked and least deve-
loped countries, the lowering of tariff and non-tariff barriers
as well, fiscal compensation schemes, the simultanous strengthen-
ing of regional and sub-regional groupings, and monetary coope-
ration facilities (UNCTAD, 1981).- 2 -
Northern to Southern sources and as a countervailing remedy
against" being exploited under "unequal exchange" conditions.
Reciprocity is intended to stress the argument of "inter-LDC
burden sharing" should trade liberalization focus on trade
creation and hence lead to adjustment problems of domestic pro-
duction in the short run._ Thus, reciprocity is a way of defus-
ing internal political opposition (Havrylyshyn/Wolf, 1981, p.31),
The political perception of a long-term declining absorption in
the North may explain why even the outward-looking Southeast
Asian NICs within the Group of 77 (G 77) agreed to resort to a
global discriminatory trading arrangement in spite of the dis-
appointing experiences in the past.
Given this constellation this paper - after highlighting inter-
regional trade among developing countries over the past decade -
attempts to estimate trade effects of such an inter-regional
arrangement under the condition of reciprocity. Furthermore, the
impact of tariff-cut-induced structural changes in inter-deve-
loping country trade on transportation costs and the relevance
of non-tariff barriers are briefly discussed._ o
I. Past Trends in Inter-Regional Inter-Developing Country Trade
During the last decade inter-regional South-South trade steadily
increased in importance (Hughes, 1980, table 1.3), thereby, how-
ever, a distinction can be made between total South-South trade
and non-fuel South-South trade. Whereas the inter-regional share
in total South-South trade increased from 29.7 percent in 1970 to
47.9 percent in 1979, the share of non-fuel inter-regional trade
in non-fuel South-South trade changed from 12.8 percent to 34.2
percent. These differences reveal that though trade in fuels plays
a more important role in inter-regional than in intra-regional
South-South trade, the dynamics of inter-regional trade are de-
termined by non-fuel products, specifically by manufactures. Inter-
regional South-South trade in manufactures increased by an annual
average growth rate of about 32 percent during the seventies com-
pared to 26 percent in intra-regional trade with manufactures.
45 percent of the absolute increase in inter-regional manufac-
tured exports during 1970 and 1979 referred to South/Southeast
Asian exports to the Middle East followed by manufactured exports
from the same region to Africa (17 percent) and to Latin America
(15 percent).
It becomes evident from these figures that the manufactured export
surge of South/Southeast and East Asia to the North has found its
parallel to the South, where more than three quarters of the in-
ter-regional South-South manufactured export increases during the
seventies originated from this region. The same parallel, however in:a
downward trend,holds for Latin America whose steady decline in world
manufactured exports after a period of excessive regional import
substitution has been accompanied by losses of "Southern" export
markets outside Latin America: only 11 percent of the absolute
increase in inter-regional South-South manufactured exports during
Throughout this paper the term "developing countries" coincides
with the UN definition which excludes Southern Europe and Israel
but includes Turkey. Furthermore, trade in crude oil. is neg-
lected since this trade will hardly be affected by tariff bar-
riers and hence will not be subjected to tariff bargaining. The
term "South-South trade" is regarded as the short version of
"inter-developing country trade".- 4 -
the last decade originated from Latin America and only 2 percent
were exported from Latin America to South/Southeast Asia.
What emerges from this very rough pattern of inter-regional trade
flows is a complementary (inter-sectoral) rather than substitutive
(intra-sectoral) division of labour between the four geographi-
cally defined blocs Latin America, Africa, Middle East and other
Asia (South/Southeast Asia). The two most industrialized areas,
Latin America and South/Southeast Asia, hardly trade with each
other (table 1), and this small amount of trade (less than 10
percent of each area's non-fuel South-South exports) exhibits
the ancient exchange pattern between a Ricardo goods exporter
(Latin America mainly exporting food, agricultural and mineral
raw materials and non-ferrous metals) and the Heckscher-Ohlin
goods exporter South/Southeast Asia.
It is striking that, in manufacturing, the Asian export
structure vis-a-vis Latin America is fairly similar to its over-
all export structure in South-South trade. Latin America, however,
shows a clear discrepancy between its overall South-South trade
pattern, which is determined by intra-area trade in manufactures,
and that of its exports to South/Southeast Asia, where primary
commodities prevail. Thus, Latin America seems to face the same
problem in its trade with southern partners as with northern part-
ners, that of being less competitive with manufactures outside
its protected regional market.
Both areas still have their major South-South export outlets in
intra-regional trade,with South/Southeast Asia being by far the more
successful in spreading its non-fuel exports to the Middle East,
Africa and Latin America (about 35 percent of its total non-fuel
South South exports in 1979) than Latin America (23 percent).Table 1: Sectoral Structure of Non-Fuel Trade between South and Southeast Asia and Latin America, 1970, 1975,1979













































































Source: UNCTAD Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics. Supplement 1981, New York 1982.- 6 -
II. Tariff and Trade Structures of Sample Countries,
The following analysis of trade effects due to tariff-cutting with-
in an inter-regional South-South framework is derived from the ta-
riff and trade structures of nine sample countries around 1978 .The
countries are generally important South-South trading partners and,
more specif ically, leading countries in their regions. They are partly
NICs (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and South Korea), partly
OPEC countries (Algeria, Saudi Arabia), and partly small
outward-oriented middle-income countries (Thailand, Tunisia). India
as the residual country is a border case with respect to the NICs
status and has been included because of its strong South-South trade
links. The choice of these countries was furthermore determined by
2
the availability of compatible trade and tariff data . Free trade
zones like Singapore and Hongkong, though being important South-
South traders, were disregarded as a "non-problem" in South-South
tariff bargaining. Sub-saharian African countries were neglected
as well, since - given their small markets - they are not likely
to play an important role in an inter-regional tariff bargaining
process.
The share of the sample countries in total non-oil South-South
trade amounted to about 48 percent in 1978.
2
Preference has been given to the 4-digit BTN tariff numbers as
the most appropriate level of disaggregation in order to avoid the
aggregation bias of averaging high and low tariffs (Cline et al.,
1978, Appendix G., p. 285 seq.). A higher level which would have
raised the number of items from about 1000 to about 5000 for
each country, as applied by Cline et al., 1978, did not pass a
cost-benefit evaluation. The discrepancy between tariffs and
trade data on the one hand and the availability of import demand
elasticities only on a much higher aggregation level on the other
hand as well as the tremendous increase in data compiling and
computational costs led to the a priori conclusion to apply the
4-digit BTN level even if some aggregation bias problems should
emerge. For two countries Argentina and India only 5-digit and
4-digit SITC-trade data respectively, were available. In these
cases trade data were converted into BTN equivalents in order to
allow for a compatible disaggregation level for all sample coun-
tries.- 7 -
Tables 2-4 illustrate both the nominal tariffs and trade pat-
terns of the sample countries and their imports from the North
and South structured by tariff frequencies. Notwithstanding
inter-country differences in the import patterns of the sample
countries, two common aspects are noteworthy (table 2): ••
Firstly, developing countries predominantly import intermediates
from other developing countries, whereas capital and consumer
goods are less important. There is only one significant deviation
from this picture: Saudi Arabia whose import structure in 1980
revealed a greater share of consumer goods imports from develop-
ing countries. This obviously emerges from the country's high
per capital income, its lack of import-competing domestic indu-
stries and its extraordinarily low protection level (table 3).
Since intermediates are complements rather than substitutes, to do-
mestic industrial production, one may say that this first aspect
underlines the complementary trading pattern in South-South trade.
Secondly, the sample countries' imports from the North are clear-
ly biased against consumer goods. No clear predominance of either
capital goods or intermediates in the sample countries from the
North, can be ascertained. However, those countries which to a
large extent launched public infrastructure investments (OPEC
countries, Mexico) at the end of the seventies reveal a higher
share of capital goods in imports from the North than others.
This import structure mirrors the nominal tariff structure (ta-
ble 3). For each sample country the tariff structure exhibits
the well-known escalation effect of the tariffs and hence an ef-
fective rate of protection of consumer goods which exceeds the
nominal rate. In view of the low income levels for the mass of
the population in the sample countries and their demand prefe-
rences towards simple consumer goods, the escalation effect is
likely to hamper South-South trade in these goods rather than in
high quality imports from the North, where the tariff burden can
be shifted much more easily to the high-income class consumers.Table 2 - Sectoral Composition of Developing Countries' Imports from Developing and
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Sources: See Statistical Appendix.- 9 -
Table Average Nominal Tariffs in the Sample Countries,
























































Sources: See statistical Appendix.- 10 -
Whereas the tariff structures reveal similar patterns, the ta-
riff levels sharply deviate from each other, and this could
raise serious problems with regard to the common tariff-cutting
formula to be applied and to the constraints of reciprocity.
The tariff frequency distribution (table 4) shows that for se-
ven of the nine countries the median tariff interval is lower
or equal for imports from developing countries than for imports
from developed countries. That means that on the average South-
South trade occurs in lower tariff items' than South-North trade
and is consistent with the outcome emerging from table 2 (i.e.
South-South trade centers on relatively low-tariffed interme-
diates thereby complementing the highly protected domestic fi-
nished goods production) . Furthermore in general the frequency distribu-
tions exhibit something like a "prohibitive tariff wall" at
the 70 percent level. Tariff reductions which would fail to cut
the tariffs below the prohibitive rates could not be expected to
stimulate imports.
The third aspect which seems to be common to all sample coun-
tries is the relatively low share of South-South imports in total
imports once some primary commodities and fuels are excluded. Even
in the Latin American countries where intra-regional trade is most
advanced this share does not exceed 17 percent of total imports.
In analogy to one of the basic theoretical principles of trade
and welfare effects in a customs union, the positive correlation
between the effects and the share of inter-partner trade in total
It should be noted here that preferential tariffs which some of
the sample countries concede either to partner countries in a re-
gional integration scheme (for instance the Latin American coun-
tries within LAFTA) or within a sub-regional scheme (for in-
stance within the GATT protocol), are disregarded in.this paper
in order to allow for a common and compatible MFN tariff base in
the negotiation process. This leads necessarily to an overestima-
tion of the trade creation effects for the three Latin American
countries where in 19 77 about 57 percent (Argentina), 80 percent
(Brazil) and 52 percent (Mexico) of total intra-regional imports
of the countries concerned occurred in preferential items, how-









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Including socialist countries. - Based on unweighted average tariffs and trade flows in four-digit BIN items except for Argen-
tina and India, where trade flows available in five-digit SITC items resp. four-digit SITC items were made compatible with the
average tariffs for four-digit BTN items. Items comprising raw materials such as cereals (BTN 1001-05), crude oil (2709), natural
fertilizers (3101), natural rubber (4001) - to mention the most important ones - have been disregarded. -
 c Minimum tariff. -

































































































































Sources: See statistical appendix.- 12 -
trade , one can argue that, based on this criterion, the trade
effects are likely to be small.
III. Trade Effects in a Developing Countries Tariff-Cutting Round
The trade effects which arise from multilateral tariff-cutting
will differ according to whether the cuts are applied to the
negotiating parties - in our case the sample countries - , or to
all developing countries or, as a reference system, to all trad-
ing partners from developing and developed countries
However, an agreement on a common formula will not only depend
on the trade effects but also on reciprocity criteria such as the
balance of additional imports and exports or the tariff revenues
foregone. The latter criteria are economically doubtful, but as
mentioned above, politically highly relevant. Under these condi-
tions four questions will be empirically discussed:
Firstly, based on the sample countries, what are the trade crea-
tion effects of a discriminatory tariff-cutting round whereby
tariff reductions on imports from all developing countries would
be conceded by a common formula? In this case imports from de-
veloped countries would be discriminated.
Secondly, to what extent would the balance of tariff-cutting-
induced additional imports and exports in each sample country
be changed, if the tariff reductions were conceded to imports
See Lipsey (1960).
2
These effects only refer to trade creation, not to trade diver-
sion. The reason why estimates on the shift of imports from deve-
loped countries' sources to developing countries' sources due to
discriminatory tariff cuts are not presented in this paper is
simply that estimates on cross price elasticities between imports
from the two sources were not available. Assumptions on cross
price elasticities (Armington, 1969) or second-best measures such
as the Baldwin/Murray approach (1977) of linking trade diversion
to trade creation(by equaling patterns of substitutability between
imports from beneficiaries and domestic production on the one
hand and imports from beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries on the
other hand) do not seem to be appropriate in our case. Using the
latter approach estimates made by the author on trade diversion in
a discriminatory South-South tariff-cutting round yielded lower
trade diversion than trade creation effects. This seems to be in-
herent with regard to the concept applied rather than to be rea-
listic. The results (on a four-digit ISIC-level) are available
upon request.BlblJothek des Instftutt
"
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from the other eight partner countries? He.nce in this case de-
veloped countries and also the rest of non-participating deve-
loping countries are discriminated against.
Thirdly, how would the trade creation effects be changed if the
tariff cuts were applied to world imports of the sample countries?
Thus in this case tariff-cutting would be non-discriminatory.
Fourthly, assuming the participating countries would agree to the
average depth of tariff cut ("tariff revenue foregone" approach)
as the common criterion of reciprocity in a discriminatory tariff
concession round, which formula would be best suited to meet both
condi.tions, reciprocity and a substantial tariff reduction?
The methodology of measuring trade creation is based on the fami-
liar concept , that is the percentage change in the price of im-
ports to the consumer caused by the tariff cut multiplied by the
price elasticity of demand for imports. Since the consumer price
is assumed to be equal to the cif-price plus tariff, the percen-
tage reduction in the price of imports to the consumer equals the
reduction of tariffs in percentage points divided by unity plus
the initial tariff. The percentage reduction in the price of im-
ports to consumers is multiplied by the initial value of imports
from preferential sources in order to measure trade creation.
Additionally world prices are assumed to be constant (infinite
elasticity of import supply) so that the percentage change in the
value of imports equals the percentage change in the quantity of
imports.
Thus, if y. is the reduction of tariffs in percentage points, t.
the initial tariff, n. the price elasticity of import demand and
M. the initial value of imports from developing countries and i
the 4-digit BTN item, trade creation (TC.) is calculated as
TCi
 = "i • TTTT *
 Mi
See for example Baldwin/Murray (1977), Cline et al. (1978).- 14 -
Secondly, it is implicitly assumed that import prices will fall
by the same rate as tariffs fall. An increase of export prices
due to rigidities on factor and goods markets in the exporting
developing countries is ruled out. Though in general this "small-
country" assumption seems to be appropriate for our case because
of the low weight of inter-LDC trade, it is not unlikely that in
some particular products where neighbour trade for instance is
important,exporting partner countries may respond to the in-
creasing demand of tariff-cutting importing countries with ex-
port price increases. This of course would reduce the trade crea-
tion effects. Since no empirical estimates on splitting the ta-
riff reduction into an import price decrease and an export price
increase component are available, this assumption has to be made .
With regard to the empirical estimates a discrepancy emerges be-
tween the high level of tariff disaggregation items and the in-
availability of price elasticities both at this level and for the
country group concerned. This problem is inherent to all such em-
pirical enquiries and leads to the problem of either aggregating
tariffs and trade flows up to levels comparable with the avai-
lable elasticity estimates (and hence facing an aggregation bias
in averaging low and high tariffs) or applying all items which
can be subsumed under a broader category (say 2-digit BTN) to a
common elasticity. In this paper which resorts to elasticity
estimates from several studies (see appendix, table 5), the lat-
ter alternative has been chosen in order to keep the loss of in-
formation due to aggregation as low as possible .
In testing the responsiveness of trade creation effects to al-
ternative tariff-cutting formulas nine formulas, all proposed
by the GATT contracting parties during the Tokyo Round, are
See for instance, Balassa for a discussion of the relevance of
this aspect in inter-developed countries' trade (1967, p. 321
seq.).- 15 -
considered (see appendix, table 4). They encompass linear cuts
and harmonization formulas with different tariff floors. These
formulas clearly mirror the bi- and multilateral export in-
terests of the OECD countries which proposed them. Thus, deve-
loping countries, once they find themselves in a similar
position of proposing formulas in a tariff bargaining process
exclusively among developing countries, would probably have other
perceptions concerning the formulas to be negotiated. The most realistic
view,however, seems to be that they would have no ideas because
of the negligible amount of trade among them, especially
in inter-regional trade. Only neighbour countries like Brazil
and Argentina whose bilateral trade is advanced would know about
the tariff obstacles facing their exports to the neighbour and
hence would propose specific formulas to eliminate them. The
majority of the negotiating parties, however,would probably re-
sort to linear cuts (as recently proposed by the UNCTAD Secre-
tariat) , due to the lack of knowledge of the other parties' ta-
riff structures and of potential trade.
Therefore the Tokyo Round proposals employed here should only
be regarded as guidelines which in view of the much higher ta-
riffs in developing countries and the low volume of South-South
trade are far from being realistic alternatives in the concrete
bargaining process.
III.A. Trade Creation due to Discriminatory Tariff-Cutting
Table 5 provides some evidence with regard to the first question.
The estimates of trade creation which emerge from the sample
countries' tariff cuts conceded to all developing countries
range between about 2 percent of Saudi Arabian imports from
the South and about one quarter in the case of India. Not sur-
prisingly, the bulk of additional South-South trade falls to
Brazil and India, the two countries with the highest initial
amount of South-South non-oil trade. Table 5 also highlights
that although it makes a difference whether linear or harmonizing









































































































































































































A = in Mill. US-$. The official exchange rate has been applied for the conversion
of the estimates made in national currency into US-# except for Argentina, India
and South Korea where trade data in US-0 were available.











Source: See statistical appendix.- 17 -
than expected. This is because the harmonizing formulas mostly
incorporate tariff floors in order to avoid a "leapfrog" effect,
that is to cut down the higher tariffs on finished goods so much
that they would end up even lower than intermediate tariffs.
Since high tariffs are the rule rather than the exception in our
sample countries, this built-in "break" in cutting high tariffs
is often applied thus levelling the differences between the va-
rious formulas. Furthermore, since there is not much initial
trade in high tariff items the empirical concept does not allow
for high trade creation effects even if the break of tariff
floors had not been built in. Here evidently the concept
leads to an underestimation of the trade effects.
Two other findings are noteworthy. Firstly, following the cal- .
culation, a moderate linear cut of about 10 to 15 percent pro-
posed by the UNCTAD secretariat as a starting point in the GSTP
negotiations (UNCTAD, 1981) would have a "peanuts" effect of
4-6 percent additional South-South trade at a maximum. For a
country like Saudi Arabia whose average tariff level is only
3 percent, such a moderate cut would be a "quantite negligeable".
Secondly, developing countries with tariff levels compatible to
those of developed countries, such as Saudi Arabia in our case,
will experience larger trade creation differences (in absolute
terms) should the various Tokyo Round formulas be applied by
them. This is because the formulas provide various options of
how to handle cuts for low tariffs of about 5 percent or less
(that means either to freeze them, to eliminate them or cut them
by the common rates). For example, if developing countries would
agree to eliminate the tariffs below 5 percent and to cut
the other tariffs by 60 percent (the full US authority of libera-
lization under the 1974 US Trade Act, formula 7) Saudi Arabia
would become a defacto free trade zone and would hence exhibit
the largest trade creation effects under this formula (table 5).- 18 -
III.B. Trade Creation In a 9-Country Concession Round
The second question put forth in the paper (the estimates on
additional exports and imports in a 9-country concession round)
can only be tackled very tentatively,since we did not record ex-
ports and imports of the nine countries with each other for in-
dividual items. Instead the share of the eight partner countries
in each sample country's total non-oil South-South exports and
imports has been multiplied by the trading partner's and the own
trade creation effects (table 5). Thus the export side reflects
the import estimates: the additional imports are taken as an in-
crement of the supplier country's exports .
The results indicate that for six countries additional imports
exceed additional exports (table 6). This group encompasses of
course the two OPEC members Algeria and Saudi Arabia, whose ex-
port basket in South-South trade does not yet contain anything more
significant than crude oil. Also the two largest South-South
importers in this group, Brazil and India, would run a trade
deficit as well as Tunisia and Thailand. The three other coun-
tries which are strong exporters of manufactures in their re-
gions, Argentina, Mexico and South Korea would run a concession-
induced surplus. Except in one case (Brazil, formula 6), the
question of whether a deficit or a surplus is run, does not de-
pend on the tariff formula applied.
In any case, the sample countries' balances are so small in re-
lation to total trade, that they should not prove to be serious
2
obstacles in a concession round . The more, however, the inter-
' In algebraical terms the additional imports and exports of a
country m are:
M = \ TC • r ' and X = f TC * q m , m run m
 L.. n ^mn
n=1 n=l
where TCm is total trade creation of country m, rnm is the share
of country n in total non-oil South-South imports of country m,
TCn is total trade creation of country n and qmn is the share
of country m in country n's total non-oil South-South imports.
2
This may explain why in practice the problem of reciprocity in
trade negotiations among developing countries under flexible or
fixed exchange rates did not receive much attention contrary to
the seven GATT rounds, where the alternatives of unilateral ver-
sus reciprocal trade liberalization were highly influenced by
assumptions on exchange rate regimes (Blackhurst, 1977).- 19 -
Table 6 : Estimates of Changes in Trade Balances Due to a 9-LDCs
Discriminatory Tariff Concession Round, in Mill. US-#







































































































































































































































































































(from) the eight partner countries.
Source: See statistical appendix.- 20 -
regional character of such a round could be changed into an intra-
regional round, say if instead of Thailand, Tunisia, South Korea
and India other Latin American countries would participate, the
more attention such balances would receive in a negotiating pro-
cess. Developing countries are much more aware of concrete trade
obstacles in intra-regiona-1 trade than in the less advanced in-
ter-regional trade, and therefore they would tend to contribute
own concessions to deteriorating trade balances in an intra-regio-
nal framework even if this could not be justified for economic
reasons. A mixed group of developing countries from various re-
gions would,therefore,seem less susceptible to misleading argu-
ments in terms of trade balances than a group of regionally con-
centrated partners.
III.C. Trade Creation due to Non-Discriminatory Tariff Cuts
In answering the third question the tariff-cutting formulas were
applied to the sample countries' imports from the world in
each item instead of to the imports from developing countries
only (table 7). Such a non-discriminatory tariff concession can
of course only serve as a reference system for a discriminatory
round. Table 7 should therefore be compared with table 5.
In general the sample countries would face a higher increase in
their total imports than in their imports from developing coun-
tries, each measured in terms of initial imports from both sour-
ces (column B in tables 5 and 7). This result can be explained
by drawing upon the tariff frequencies in South-North and South-
South imports (table 4). Here it emerged that on the average
actual imports from developed countries occur in higher tariff
items than imports from developing countries. The obvious de-
viation from this average pattern, Thailand, also appears to be
the exception with regard to the comparison between the share
of additional imports due to either discriminatory and non-dis-
criminatory tariff cuts. For Thailand the former ones yield
slightly higher shares (table 5) than the latter ones (table 7).
Thus, the tariff level differentials in South-North and South-Table 7 - Estimates of Trade Expansion Due to Non-Discriminatory




































































































































































































































Source: See statistical appendix.
i- 22 -
South trade affect the differentials in the amount of additional
imports created by the cuts: Higher initial tariffs in South-
North imports provoke higher growth rates in imports from the
North (compared to the South-South trade) once the protection
is lowered and vice versa.
IV. The Issue of Reciprocity
The requirement of sharing the costs and benefits of multi-
lateral trade negotiations "equally" gained high attention in
the past GATT rounds, especially of course under fixed exchange
rate conditions.,although it is a politically determined "subjective
notion" (Arthur Dunkel) rather than an economically meaningful
concept. Not only from the world's welfare viewpoint but also
from an individual country's point of view it seems irrational
to link import liberalization - which contributes to a more effi-
cient allocation of the country's own resources - to the re-
quirement that others behave in the same way.
However, politicians will look upon trade liberalization as a
burden to be shared equally, the more the economic environment
resembles the nationalist, mercantilist world described for in-
stance by Schumpeter (1940) as a justification for protectionist
measures. There is no reason to believe that multilateral trade
negotiations among developing countries are stimulated by a
higher degree of solidarity or a deeper economic understanding
than tariff rounds among developed countries. As a matter of
fact, the opposite could well be expected since developing coun-
tries' politicians are relatively open to etatist, autocratic
decision-making and hence will be unwilling to give up national
sovereignty in tariff policies in order to promote collective
self-reliance or other relatively vague South-South cooperation
ideals.
Reciprocity will therefore be an indispensable constraint in
South-South tariff bargaining and - given the wide range of ta-
riff levels among the negotiating partners - a most restrictive- 23 -
one. The most commonly used practical concept of reciprocity is
"the average depth of tariff cut" approach (Cline et al., appen-
dix A). It only refers to the import side and considers an equal
average percentage change in the tariff, irrespective of its
initial level,as a "reciprocal" cut. Countries having low initial
tariff levels such as Saudi Arabia in our case, receive a "bonus"
of a smaller import price reduction under a given percentage
change of the tariff than countries with relatively high tariffs.
The major problem of calculation refers to the weighting problem
if the average depth of tariff cut is to be calculated for each
partner country. In spite of all shortcomings and distortions
the import value is mostly accepted as, the better alternative to
unweighted averages. Of the two possible weighting concepts -
the loss in tariff revenues measured as a share of total tariff
revenues under pre-cut tariff conditions, and the weighting of
individual tariff item depth of cut by the share of individual
tariff item imports in total imports - the first one has been chosen
here. Firstly, because it provides a countervailing effect against
the whole reciprocity approach which is in favour of low initial
tariffs . Secondly, because the loss of: tariff revenues is likely
to receive rather high political attention in tariff bargaining
among developing countries whose budget sources depend to a large
extent on indirect taxes many of which are import duties (Ko-
stecki/Seck, 1982)
2.
The problem of reciprocity measured by the "tariff revenues fore-
gone" concept only arises for harmonizing cuts, since the linear
cut equals the depth of tariff cut by definition. Developing
countries which would be prepared to strengthen South-South trade
forcefully by eliminating the escalation effect of their tariffs,
High tariff items have a stronger weight in the first weighting
concept than in the second one.
2
Admittedly, the loss of collectible revenues is economically
the least convincing argument for reciprocity.In any case it has
been responsible for the distribution disputes in many South-
South regional schemes and for the consequent disintegration
measures and their costs. It should therefore not be neglect-
ed in practice.- 24 -
hence would face a conflict between this objective and the re-
ciprocity constraint. Table 8, which displays the average depth
of tariff cuts for our sample countries under the various formulas,
firstly yields the result that for an individual country the range
between the average depths for the harmonization formulas (2-5,
7-9) is the wider, the lower the initial tariff is (Saudi Ara-
bia) , because then the various tariff floors, which smooth the
depth of cuts, are not applied. Secondly, for the same reason
(tariff floors) the discrepancies between the negotiating part-
ners' cuts under a given non-linear formula are the higher, the
higher the initial tariff differentials. The relatively liberal
developing countries with low tariff levels, which are the ex-
ception rather than the rule, will therefore complicate the bar-
gaining process, if they should insist on both non-linear cuts
and the "tariff revenues foregone" criterion for reciprocity.
Let us assume that the criterion of choice between the various
depths of cuts under non-linear formulas would be to minimize
the individual countries' deviations from an average depth for
all partners. This would mean that also countries with rela-
tively low tariffs would have to face a similar depth of cut
as countries with high tariffs. Then in our case formula 7 would
have to be chosen. Under this formula Saudi Arabia would have
to eliminate almost all of its tariffs on imports from develop-
ing countries so that the percentage change of its tariff would
be substantial and similar to those of the other partners with
higher initial tariffs. Just the opposite would occur should
the countries apply formula 2, the "three iteration" formula.
Under this formula the percentage cut in the Saudi Arabian tariff
would be by far lower and would therefore fail to guarantee an
equal or at least similar average depth of tariff cut for all ne-
gotiating partners under non-linear formulas.
Irrespective of more sophisticated criteria of reciprocity,
for instance that of balancing additional imports and exports,Table 8 : Average Depth of Tariff Cut ("Tariff Revenue Forgone" Measure)
a under Alternative Tariff
































































































































Sources: See appendix- 26 -
this very simple way of measuring reciprocity already highlights
the restrictive nature of this constraint once the bargaining
partners agree to change the structure (and not only the level
of tariffs) by resorting to harmonization formulas.
V. Changing South-South Trade Structures and Transportation Costs
In his 1978 survey article on regional economic cooperation (in-
tegration) among developing countries Vaitsos condemmed the whole
trade creation/trade diversion debate as "thought diverting",
"basically static or comparative static" (thus not addressing it-
self "to the issues of major interest on development" and hence,
to a large extent, as irrelevant for developing countries (Vait-
sos, 1978, pp. 750-751).
It is true that the trade creation/trade diversion concept is
basically static. However, if it is to be empirically discussed
for a wide range of countries without having to resort to guess-
work or trivial statements, it is the only approach which can be
taken. Furthermore, decision-makers in developing countries de-
vote great attention to this subject as has been witnessed by the
time-consuming debates on tariff-cutting procedures in regional
and sub-regional arrangements. Much of this time could have been
saved if the knowledge of the partner's tariff and trade struc-
tures would have been better thus reducing uncertainty and im-
proving the transparency of the bargaining subject. Studies on
trade creation/trade diversion issues, though being admittedly
defective, clarify what is to be negotiated.
These issues can also be looked upon as a basics for developing
further hypotheses. There is, for instance, the argument that
South-South trade is seriously hampered by transportation costs
in two ways: in absolute terms by high costs due (among others)
to lack of shipping services among developing countries espe-
cially in inter-regional transport, and in relative terms by
lower transportation costs in South-North imports of goods com-- 27 -
peting with developing countries
1 imports from other developing
countries . In this context Yeats (1980) proposed to charge South-
North imports on a cif-basis and South-South imports on a fob-
basis in order to eliminate this transport cost disadvantage.
However, apart from the implications of this proposal on a further
regionalization of world trade, increasing bureaucracy in customs
clearance procedures and growing incentives to fake invoices and
to undertake indirect imports, the empirical evidence for this
argument is not very convincing. For Brazil which records its
imports on a cif and fob base, it could be shown that though such
a disadvantage exists it neither appears systematic nor signifi-
cant (Langhammer, 1983a). The appendix table 1 displays the 1978
cif-fob import unit value ratios for Brazil on a two-digit BTN
base by different suppliers from developed and developing coun-
tries. For total imports the transportation costs amount to about
10 percent of the fob-value which is exactly the "thumb" rate used
by the IMF to convert fob into cif data. On the whole it does not
make any difference to transportation costs whether Brazil imports
from the US, the FRG or Japan on the one hand or from South Korea,
HOngkong or Singapore on the other hand, not to mention the intra-
Latin American trade with Mexico and Argentina. The rates for
imports from India, Israel and Taiwan show that this pattern is
by no means systematic, that means that it differs according to
supplier countries (even neighbouring countries) and particularly
according to products. The distance does not seem to influence
the transportation costs in a clear-cut way, because the costs
which arise mainly depend on the sort of products traded South-
South and on the technology of transport. Here tariff-cutting
may have an essential impact on transportation costs in South-
South trade. Should developing countries envisage an elimination
of the escalation effects in their tariffs by negotiating a har-
Insidentally, if this argument should hold, then the trade
diversion effects would be less striking.- 28 -
monization formula, then, for instance, low quality mass con-
sumer goods not being currently traded would enter South-South
trade.This trade would then become more substitutive and less
complementary. More consumer goods in South-South trade, how-,
ever, would mean more container shipping, reduced costs of
trans-shipment, less requirements of establishing South-South
liner services in routes where less-than-shipload quantities
are involved (Ramsay, 1981) and ultimately lower transportation
costs.
In short: The shift from traditional South-South bulk trade to
new South-South piece goods trade opens the door towards con-
tainerization of South-South trade. This technology will reduce
one of the major bottlenecks in South-South trade, the high
costs of shipping a product say from South Asia to Latin America
via a US or European container trans-shipment port. Parallel
to the NIC's manufactured exports surge, these countries in par-
ticular, but also other developing countries experienced a rapid
progress in containerizing their South-North trade during the
last decade. The appendix table 2 shows that many developing
countries surpassed developed countries in a ranking list of
the world's most important container traffic ports. Above all
this holds for Hongkong, Taiwan and Singapore, but also coun-
tries which did not appear in the 1973 ranking list such as Ar-
gentina, Ivory Coast, South Korea, Nigeria or Thailand improved
their container facilities rapidly. That means that these coun-
tries would not only be prepared to be countries of origin or
destination in South-South shipping but they could also serve
as trans-shipment countries, if this should prove to be econo-
mically more viable than to use trans-shipment ports in deve-
loped countries. Growing South-North container trade has there-
fore the positive side-effect of improving the facilities for
South-South container trade too, once South-South trade in fi-
nished goods could be released from the barriers of high effec-
tive protection.- 29 -
VI. South-South Trade and Non-Tariff Barriers
NTBs are the most obvious but least well-known .obstacles in
South-South trade.. Though inventories on specific NTBs in de-
veloping countries are available.which simply enumerate the
frequencies of barriers applied in order to find sectoral pat-
terns of barriers (Langhammer, 1983b), the only way to explore
the incidence of the barriers on trade is via comparison
of world market prices and domestic prices. Here perhaps the
United Nations International Comparison Project run by Kravis"and
his associates may be helpful because of its wide collection of
binary purchasing-power parities (PPPs) for developing and de-
veloped countries in very detailed product categories (Kravis
et al., 1982, pp. 2O8-215)
1.
A very preliminary approach towards detecting price differen-
tials among developing countries was launched in this paper
by using the Kravis data. The PPPs were transformed into in-
dices where the price for the "same" good in the US served as
the common numeraire and hence as the base (US Price Level =
100). Furthermore, the indices were at first sectorally and
then regionally aggregated up to the 3- or 4-digit ISIC level
and then up to regional blocs respectively (appendix table 3).
With regard to the latter aggregation the underlying hypotheses
was that due to the larger intensity of intra-regional rather
than of inter-regional trade,links, the national price devia-
In a letter addressed to the author Prof. Kravis, however,
a warning was expressed not to rely tod much on PPPs for in-
dividual detailed categories because they were based on such
a small number of observations that they could not be of-
fered as being of truly publishable quality. He recommended
to aggregate them in a.different way than he did.
2
As exchange rates the 19 75 official rates used, by Kravis
were applied for transformation purposes.- 30 -
tions from a regional average would be smaller than from an
average of all developing countries from all regions. Further-
more, the differences in average price levels and national de-
viations between the four.regional blocs Africa, South Asia,
Southeast Asia, and Latin America were of interest.
For a 4-digit ISIC average across the whole manufacturing
sector (ISIC 3), in which, however, metal manufacturing in- .
dustries (ISIC 382-85) predominate, the results are as fol-
lows:
Prices are the highest in Latin America and Africa and by
about 20 percent lower in South- and Southeast Asia. On the
average the price level in developing countries is by one
third higher than in the US. However, there are large sub-
regional deviations from this average.
The national price deviations in absolute terms and in re-
lative terms (coefficient of variation)r are larger in the
total developing countries' sample, that means inter-regio-
nally, than intra-regionally. Though the regional samples
are very small and thus statistically not well-founded,
this result could lend some support to the hypothesis men-
tioned above. Tendencies towards price equalization seem
therefore to be more advanced in the intra-regional than in
the inter-regional framework of South-South trade.
The three East and Central African countries Malawi, Kenya and
Zambia are probably not only protected by tariffs and NTBs but
also by transportation costs, especially with respect to the
two land-locked countries. For these low-income developing coun-
tries some price differentials probably do not mark protection
equivalents for a non-existing local industry but retail
margins for distributors.- 31 -
All developing countries reveal lower domestic food prices
compared to developed countries' prices and the same holds
for simple raw material-based industrial products such as
textiles, footwear, and wood products. Again it should be
stressed that the ISIC-3 average is biased by the metal
manufacturing branches where the developed countries' prices
are much lower.
Finally, it should be noted that on the basis of the Kravis
data some attempts have been started to calculate tariff equi-
valents of NTBs in some developing countries as a residual
of differences between world market prices plus tariffs on the
one hand and domestic prices on the other hand .
Not surprisingly, the price differentials among developing
countries are generally much higher than those among deve-
loped countries. This finding holds irrespective of whether
one refers to neighbouring developing countries (where this
distinction is less pronounced) or to a mixed sample of
developing countries from all regions. Since the proportion
between tariffs and the NTB residual seems to fluctuate hea-
vily with regard to the product or product group concerned,
. It would go beyond the scope of this paper to record these
results which are based on the average of the three lowest
country price indices for an individual product as a world
market price proxy .> As an interesting result it emerged that
in some product groups, especially in food products, the
proxy-plus-tariff price exceeded the domestic price by far.
Thus, it can be assumed that in these cases there was water
in the tariff (as has also been experienced in the NBER
countries studies (Krueger et al., 1981, p. 20). Copies of
these estimates are available upon request.- 32 -
detailed country studies will have to be made in order to
analyse the relevance of both types of obstacles to South-
South trade.
VII. Conclusions
South-South trade is still more complementary than
substitutive. This pattern of inter-industry specia-
lization will,in any case, change in the long run along rising
income levels,but developing countries will not have to look
on inactively. In the short run policy instruments are avai-
lable to give incentives to promote substitutive trade. However, this
implies adjustment costs for those countries which over-
proportionately relied on regional import substitution as
a means of stimulating South-South trade. Mainly Latin Ame-
rican countries would have to cope with adjustment costs
should they enter into global tariff-cutting negotiations
with South/Southeast Asian countries.
Whereas the latter group of countries successfully pene-
trated into developing countries' markets outside its region,
especially into the Middle East countries with their high ab-
sorption of manufactures during the late seventies, Latin
American countries widely failed to spread their supply of
manufactures traded among each other, to other developing
countries' regions. Admittedly, the low-income African coun-
tries cannot play the role as export markets for Latin Ame-
rica that is played by the high-income Middle East countries
for South/Southeast Asia. However, the patterns in bilateral
trade between Latin America and South/Southeast Asia strongly
support the hypothesis that South-South trade in competitive
income-elastic goods, mainly simple consumer products, is not
going to be dominated by the intra-regionally-oriented Latin
American countries but by the extra-regionally oriented South/
Southeast Asian countries.- 33 -
Such a perspective renders reciprocal tariff bargaining be-
tween countries from both areas most difficult, especially if
not based on an item-by-item approach but on a common formula.
Inter-regional trade flows between developing countries are
still small, hence open to rapid changes and subjected to a
large amount of uncertainty. The negotiating partners will
therefore have only vague perceptions of what would happen if
tariffs would be cut.
Given the escalation effect in the developing countries' tariffs,
competitive suppliers of finished goods would be better off than
other countries, especially if instead of a linear cut a harmo-
nization formula favouring South-South trade in consumer goods
could be negotiated. Under such a scenario Latin American coun-
tries would see their regional preferential framework eroded with-
out being able in the short run to profit with their export supply
from market access improvements in other developing countries' .
areas. It is rather unlikely that politicians would agree to
such a deal though for economic reasons a harmonization formula
would be preferable. Among others a harmonizing cut would stimu-
late South-South container shipping, ease the trans-shipment pro-
blem and contribute to investments in the transportation sector.
On the other hand, however, a harmonizing cut complicates
the reciprocity aspect even more, the greater is the deviation
of the individual countries' tariff levels from each other. That
such discrepancies hold in the realm of developing countries
has been demonstrated in our mini-concession group of nine coun- .
tries.
Optimists within UNCTAD who indeed seem to prefer a "package"
approach of combining tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers,
reciprocal and non-reciprocal measures in the GSTP, should be
reminded that it took more than three years within the Kennedy-
Round (under high growth rate conditions) for relatively homo-- 34 -
geneous partners to negotiate an across-the-board cut of 50 per-
cent only as a "working hypothesis", which was later on seriously
compromised by an undefined "bare minimum of exceptions". The pe-
riod of negotiations, doubled in the Tokyo Round.
There is not much guesswork in forecasting that the forthcoming
GSTP negotiations once they start with a package deal approach
will not undercut this period. The larger, however, the period,
the higher the probability that the negotiating parties will
revise their concessions in the light of changes in the economic
environment which will have occurred in the meantime. It is,
therefore, not unlikely that the negotiations will resemble end-
less disarmament conferences where each party seeks to minimize
concessions granted, whereas in the meantime new hurdles (and
negotiation topics) are introduced.
Isolated in a South-South framework the bargaining will be re-
source-wasting and frustrating. The more fruitful alternative
would be to embody South-South trade liberalization in the broa-
der framework of North-South trade liberalization, that means to
widen the economic and political scope for more South-South sub-
stitutive trade by lowering non-tariff barriers imposed by the
North against imports from the South. One could go even further
by saying that without North-South trade liberalization South-
South trade liberalization will fail. In institutional terms this
link requires "one-track" and not "two-track" negotiations of GATT
and UNCTAD bargaining where both tracks are isolated from each
other.
The recent GATT accession of Colombia and Thailand as well as the
new "code of conduct" (differential treatment) underline that in
spite of its relatively low power to implement simple uniform
rules, the GATT has become increasingly attractive for developing
countries just because of its clear juridical framework. Reconcil-
ing this approach in North-South trade policies with the UNCTAD
paradigma of highly specific universal rules in South-South trade- 35 -
policies (where attention is paid'to the varying characteristics
and circumstances of different countries ) should be the common
objective of both organizations in order to link global libera-
lization in North-South trade and preferential treatment in
South-South trade.
See for the analysis of differences between uniform and
universal rules (Streeten, 1982).- 36 -
Appendix Table 1 - Ad Valorem Freight Rates of Brazilian Imports
a from Selected Developed and Developing
Countries, 1978 by CCT Chapters
CCT Chapter
01 Live animals
02 Meat and edible meat
offals
03 Fish, crustaceans and
molluscs
04 Dairy produce; birds'
eggs; natural honey
05 Products of animal origin
06 Live trees and other plants
07 Edible vegetables and cer-
tain roots and tubers
08 Edible fruit and nuts;
peel of melons or citrus
fruits
09 Coffee, tea, mate and
spices
10 Cereals
11 Products of the milling
industry
12 Oil seeds and oleaginous
fruit
13 Paw vegetable materials;
lacs, gums, resins
14 Vegetable plaiting and
carving materials
15 Animal and vegetable fats
and oils
16 Preparations of meat, of
fish, of crustaceans of
molluscs
17 Sugars and sugar confec-
tionery
18 Cocoa and cocoa prepara-
tions
19 Preparations of cereals,
flour or starch; pastry-
cooks' products
20 Preparations of vegetables,
fruits or other parts of
plants
21 Miscellaneous edible pre-
parations
22 Beverages, spirits and
vinegar
23 Residues and waste from
the food industries
24 Tobacco
25 Salt; sulphur; earths and
stone
26 Metallic ores,slag and ash
27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils






32 Tanning and dyeing extracts;
colours, paints and var-
nishes
33 Essential oils;perfumery,






























































































































































































































































39 Artificial resins and pla-
stic materials
40 Rubber, synthetic rubber,
factice,and articles thereof
41 Raw hides,skins and leather
42 Articles of leather,saddlery
and harness;travel goods
43 Furskins and artificial fur;
manufactures thereof
44 Wood and articles of wood;
wood charcoal
45 Cork and articles of cork
46 Basketware and wickerwork
47 Paper-making material
48 Paper and paperboard j ar-
ticles of paper pulp, of
paper or of paperboard
49 Printed books, newspapers,
pictures
50 Silk and waste silk
51 Man-made fibres (continuous)
52 Metallised textiles
53 Wood and other animal hair
54 Flax and ramie
55 Cotton
56 Man-made fibres (discon-
tinuous)
57 other vegetable textile ma-
terials; paper yarn and
woven fabrics of paper yarn
58 Carpets,mats,matting and
tapestries
59 Wadding and felt;twine,
cordage, ropes and cables
60 Knitted and crocheted goods
61 Articles of apparel and
clothing accessories of
textile fabric
62 Other made up textiles
articles
63 Old clothing and other
textile articles; rags
64 Footwear, gaiters and the
like; parts of such articles
65 Headgear and parts thereof
66 Umbrellas, sunshades, walk-
ing-sticks
67 Prepared feathers and down
and articles made of fea-
thers or of down
68 Articles of stone, of pla-
ster, of cement, of asbestos
69 Ceramic products
70 Glass and glassware






























































































































































































































































Appendix Table 1 continued
CCT Chapter
72 Coin
73 Iron and steel and articles
thereof
74 Copper and articles thereof
75 Nickel and articles thereof
76 Aluminium and articles
thereof
77 Magnesium and beryllium
and articles thereof
78 lead and articles thereof
79 Zinc and articles thereof
80 Tin and articles thereof
81 Other base metals employed
in metallurgy and articles
thereof
82 Tools, implements, cutlery,
spoons and forks, of base
mstal; parts thereof
83 Miscellaneous articles of
base metal
84 Boilers, machinery and me-
chanical appliances; parts
thereof
85 Electrical machinery and
. equipment; parts thereof
86 Railway and tramway; traffic
signalling equipment
87 Vehicles
88 Aircraft and parts thereof
89 Ships, boats
90 Optical, photographic, cine-
matographic, measuring
91 Clocks and watches and parts
thereof
92 Musical instruments; sound
recorders and reproducers
93 Arms and ammunition; parts
thereof
94 Furniture and parts thereof
95 Articles and manufactures
of carving or moulding mate-
rial
96 Brooms, brushes, feather
dusters, powder-puffs and
sieves




99 Works of art, collectors'
pieces, and antiques
Total imports













































































































































































































































Source: Ministerio de Fazenda, Comsrcio Exterior do Brasil, Ano 7, Tomo I and II. - Own calculations.- 39 -
Appendix Table 2 - World Port Container Traffic by Country 1973 and 1980
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* J. I PPPj j - 1 ... n
n j . 100 n • 14 for the developing countries' sample, respectively 11 for the developed countries
rj
where PPP. is the purchasing-power parity between the developing country j (respectively developed country) and the United
States "* and r is the 1975 exchange rate (currency units per U.S. dollar). PPP 13 defined as the number of units of
country's j currency that are required to buy what can be bought in the United States with one U.S. dollar. The developing
countries are Malawi, Kenya, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Zambia, Thailand, Philippines, South Korea, Malaysia, Colombia,
Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay. Tne developed countries are Ireland, Italy, Spain, U.K., Japan, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium,
France, Denmark, Germany. d








































































































































































































































































































Source: Calculated fran: Irving B. Kravis, Alan. Heston, Robert Sunmers, 1982, World Product and Inccme. International Com-
parisons of Real Gross Product (Baltimore: Johns ftofJOna) , Sunnary, Multilateral Table 6-3; Appendix Table 6.3,
pp. 176-79) 2O&-15.- 41 -













60 percent linear cut
Three-iteration harmonization with 15.23 floor
Canadian-type formula with 20.0 percent floor
Harmonization, 30 percent plus initial tariff y
with 12.25 percent floor
60 percent cut plus absolute 3 percent tariff
43.4 percent linear cut . . ".". ".". .
Full U.S. authority in the Tokyo Round
60 percent cut with 5 percent floor
Swiss harmonization formula.almost identical
to a six-iteration harmonization
In Algebraical Terms
y = 0.60 tQ
t1 = t (1-0.01 t ) 3 times
if tQ > 50.0, t1 = 15.23
t, = 0.5 to;
if tQ < 5.0, t1 = 0
if tQ > 40.0, t1 = 20.0
y = tQ (0.3+0.01 t )
if tQ > 35.0, t1 = 12.25
ti = 3 + 0.4 tQ
if tQ < 5.0, ti = tQ
y = 0.434 tQ
y = O.6O t
if tQ < 5.0, t1 = 0
y =0.60 tQ
if tQ < 5.0, t, = tQ





1 14 + t o
14 t
if t - ( —) > 0.6O t
14 + tQ ° I
14 t
tQ- < °> = 0.60 tQ
o
y = tariff cut in percentage points
t = initial tariff in percent
t. = final tariff after cut in percent
Source: William R. Cline et al., Trade Negotiations in the Tokyo Round, op.cit., p. 77.- 42 -
Appendix Table 5
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Sources: Noboru Kawanabe, "Disaggregated Import Demand Functions for
Japan". In: William R. Cline et al., Trade Negotiations in
the Tokyo Round. A Quantitative Assessment (Washington:
Brookings, 1978). Elasticities marked by an asterix have been
derived either from Mohsin S. Khan, 1975,"The Structure and
Behaviour of Imports of Venezuela". Review of Economics and
Statistics,- Vol. 57, pp. 221-224, or from Richard Weisskoff,
1979, "Trade, Protection and Import Elasticities for Brazil".
The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 61, pp. 58-66.- 44 -
Statistical Appendix
Algerie, Ministere des Finances, Statistiques du Commerce Exte-
rieur de I
1Algerie, 1977.
Argentina, Commodity Trade Statistics, UN-tapes.
Brazil, Ministerio da Fazenda, Comercio Exterior do Brazil, Ano 7,
1978, Importacao, Tomo I and Tomo II.
India, Commodity Trade Statistics, UN-tapes.
Mexico, Secretaria de Programacion y Presupuesto, Anuario Esta-
distico del Comercio Exterior de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos,
1976.
Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Central
Department of Statistics, Foreign Trade Statistics, 1980.
South Korea, Office of Customs Administration, Statistical Year-
book of Foreign Trade, 1978 (December).
Thailand, Department of Customs, Foreign Trade Statistics of Thai-
land, December 1978.
Tunisia, Ministere du Plan, Institut National de la Statistique,
Statistiques du Commerce Exterieur, Annee 1978.
Algeria (at I.September 1975) , Journal Official No. 104, 29 Decem-
ber 19 72 and the following amendments, reprinted in: Deutsches
Handels-Archiv, Vol. 129, 1975, No. 18.
Argentina (at 1 October 1979), official issue of October 1978 -
No. 262 and amendments, reprinted in: Deutsches Handels-Archiv,
Vol. 133, 19 79, No. 19.
Brazil (at 31 December 1977), Diario oficial, No. 42, Suppl. 4,
March 1971 and the following amendments (without GATT-List),
reprinted in: Deutsches Handels-Archiv, Vol. 132, 1978, No. 6
and 7.
India (at 1 September 1976), Customs Tariff Act, 1975, No. 51/1975
Government of India, reprinted in: Deutsches Handels-Archiv,
Vol. 130, 1976, No. 16.
Mexico (at 4 April 1979), Diario oficial, No. 26, 6 April 1979,
reprinted in: Deutsches Handels-Archiv, Vol. 133, 1979, No. 11
and 12.- 45 -
Saudi Arabia (at 1 March 1978), Bulletin International des Donanes,
Briissel, No. 192, 6th edition).
South Korea (at 12 February 1979), 1979 issue of the Korean Customs
Association, reprinted in: Deutsches Handels-Archiv, Vol. 133,
1979, No. 10.
Thailand (at 15 October 1980), Royal Thai Government Gazette,
10 April 1980, Vol. 34, 1980, No. 10, p. 111, reprinted in:
Deutsches Handels-Archiv, Vol. 134, 1980, No. 24.
Tunisia (at 1 April 1977), Journal Officiel, No. 28 of 24 July
1973 and the following amendments, reprinted in: Deutsches
Handels-Archiv, Vol. 131, 1977, No. 11.- 46 -
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